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Abstract— Security is an increasing concern in software de-
velopment. Developer Question and Answer (Q&A) websites 
provide a large amount of security discussion. Existing studies 
have used human-defined rules to mine security discussions, 
but these works still miss many posts, which may lead to an 
incomplete analysis of the security practices reported on Q&A 
websites. Traditional supervised Machine Learning methods 
can automate the mining process; however, the required nega-
tive (non-security) class is too expensive to obtain. We propose 
a novel learning framework, PUMiner, to automatically mine 
security posts from Q&A websites. PUMiner builds a context-
aware embedding model to extract features of the posts, and 
then develops a two-stage PU model to identify security content 
using the labelled Positive and Unlabelled posts. We evaluate 
PUMiner on more than 17.2 million posts on Stack Overflow 
and 52,611 posts on Security StackExchange. We show that 
PUMiner is effective with the validation performance of at 
least 0.85 across all model configurations. Moreover, Matthews 
Correlation Coefficient (MCC) of PUMiner is 0.906, 0.534 and 
0.084 points higher than one-class SVM, positive-similarity 
filtering, and one-stage PU models on unseen testing posts, 
respectively. PUMiner also performs well with an MCC of 
0.745 for scenarios where string matching totally fails. Even 
when the ratio of the labelled positive posts to the unlabelled 
ones is only 1:100, PUMiner still achieves a strong MCC of 
0.65, which is 160% better than fully-supervised learning. Us-
ing PUMiner, we provide the largest and up-to-date security 
content on Q&A websites for practitioners and researchers. 
Keywords—positive unlabelled learning, natural language 
processing, software security, mining software repositories 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Security incidents and their damaging effects are increas-
ing at an unprecedented rate [1]. There are several platforms 
reporting security vulnerabilities and attacks such as Com-
mon Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [2], National Vul-
nerability Database (NVD) [3], Common Weakness Enu-
meration (CWE) [4], Common Attack Pattern Enumeration 
and Classification (CAPEC) [5], and Open Web Application 
Security Project (OWASP) [6]. These platforms provide def-
initions and examples of known security attacks and coun-
termeasures. However, they do not support on-the-fly discus-
sion about the up-to-date usage and implementation of such 
security in real-life scenarios. For example, CWE suggests 
using the mysql_real_escape_string() function to mitigate 
SQL injection vulnerability in PHP [7], but this function was 
deprecated and one should use PDO or MySQLi instead for 
better protection [8]. Conversely, developer Question and 
Answer (Q&A) websites provide an abundance of such dis-
cussions [9]. Until 2019, Stack Overflow [10], the largest 
developer Q&A site, has had around seventeen million posts 
and more than ten million users. This is an enormous data 
source for mining patterns in secure software development. 
 Several studies [11-14] have proposed different heuristics 
to retrieve security content from open sources. Such prede-
fined rules require considerable domain expertise and human 
effort. More importantly, the rules are not exhaustive since 
security concepts keep evolving over time [15], see section 
II.B for more challenges with the existing heuristics. There is 
a need for an automatic and accurate way of retrieving secu-
rity content. It is observed that recent unsupervised 
word/document embeddings [16-19] in Natural Language 
Processing (NLP) have achieved state-of-the-art results for 
various textual information retrieval tasks. Such NLP meth-
ods can then be combined with a Machine Learning (ML) 
classifier to automatically identify security-related posts on 
developer Q&A websites without human-defined rules. 
 Building a traditional binary classification model requires 
a large amount of labelled data containing both positive (se-
curity) and negative (non-security) classes [20, 21]. Howev-
er, it is very challenging to obtain such high-quality and la-
belled datasets. Even with our sophisticated heuristics using 
the knowledge from multiple security sources (e.g., NVD, 
CVE, CWE, CAPEC, and OWASP), we are still unsure of 
the labels of more than 98% of the posts, leaving them unla-
belled. Human inspection also does not scale to such a large 
extent. Fortunately, there are still related yet much smaller 
sources that are likely to be related to the domain of interest 
for learning the patterns of the positive class. In the context 
of security, Security StackExchange [22] contains mostly 
security-related discussion, and this site also follows the 
same format as Stack Overflow. Such observations have mo-
tivated us to formulate and address a research problem “How 
to retrieve security-related content from developer Q&A 
websites using only a small quantity of labelled positive 
posts and a large number of unlabelled posts?” 
 We present PUMiner, a novel learning framework to 
mine the posts belonging to a topic of interest from develop-
er Q&A websites using only Positive and Unlabelled posts. 
Specifically, we represent the posts with a context-aware 
feature model and then build a two-stage PU learning model 
to discern security-related posts on developer Q&A websites. 
Such security posts help researchers and practitioners study 
security practices/guidelines in a software development 
lifecycle as well as improve the discovery and mitigation of 
software vulnerabilities. We have conducted large-scale ex-
periments on more than 17.2 million Stack Overflow posts 
and 52,611 Security StackExchange posts. Our findings are: 
 PUMiner is effective for retrieving security posts as 
all of its models achieved at least 0.85 F1-Score and 
G-mean on a PU validation set. 
 PUMiner had a testing Matthews Correlation Coef-
ficient (MCC) value that was 0.906, 0.534 and 
0.084 points better than one-class SVM [23], posi-
tive-similarity filtering [24] and one-stage PU mod-
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els. PUMiner also had the best MCC of 0.745 for 
cases where keyword matching completely failed. 
 PUMiner consistently outperformed a fully super-
vised approach treating all unlabelled data as nega-
tive class. Even when the unlabelled posts were 100 
times more than the labelled positive ones, PU-
Miner still achieved a strong testing MCC of 0.65. 
 In brief, our noteworthy contributions are: 
1. We are the first to formulate the retrieval of securi-
ty-related posts as a PU learning problem. 
2. We propose a novel framework, PUMiner, to re-
trieve security posts using unlabelled data. 
3. We systematically evaluate the performance of 
PUMiner using more than 17.3 million posts on 
both Stack Overflow and Security StackExchange. 
4. We provide the largest security-related datasets ex-
tracted from Stack Overflow and code at [25]. 
Outline. Section II introduces (security) post discussion on 
Q&A websites and motivates PU learning. Section III de-
scribes the proposed PUMiner framework. Section IV pre-
sents our study design/setup. Section V reports the experi-
mental results. Section VI discusses the findings and threats 
to validity. Section VII mentions the related work. Section 
VIII summarizes this work and suggests future directions. 
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATIONS 
A. Security discussion on question and answer websites 
A discussion thread on Stack Overflow developer Ques-
tion and Answer (Q&A) website is called a post [26]. Fig. 1 
illustrates the format of a post. A post contains the following 
main components: a unique id, owner, title, question, tag(s) 
and answer(s). Among the answers, one would be selected 
as the best one by the post questioner. A post also has addi-
tional information such as comments, the dates it when was 
created, edited, last-active and closed, along with the score 
(upvotes minus downvotes), the number of views and favor-
ites. A complete schema of a post on Q&A websites can be 
found at [27]. Security StackExchange, a security Q&A 
website, also follows a similar format as Stack Overflow. 
To identify security-related posts, our work would con-
sider the title, tags, question and answer bodies following 
the practices of the previous studies [11, 12, 26]. The securi-
ty relevance of a post is then decided based on the explicit 
or implicit reference or discussion about cybersecurity 
and/or any related subtopics mentioned in the title, question 
and answers of a post. A post on how to use/develop securi-
ty tools/functions/frameworks (e.g., login/authentication) is 
still related to security. However, discussing a non-security 
task (e.g., integrating third-party APIs1) that may indirectly 
involve security requirements (e.g., user’s authentica-
tion/permission) is not security-relevant. 
Security has become an increasingly important topic in 
Software Engineering [28]. However, the number of securi-
ty posts identified on Stack Overflow in the literature is still 
very limited. From our manual inspection of 385 random 
posts (i.e., 95% confidence level and 5% error [29]), we 
found sixteen (around 4%) posts were security-related. 
                                                          
1 https://stackoverflow.com/questions/35275411/trying-to-connect-to-
facebook-through-the-api 
 
Fig. 1. Format of a (security) post (id 60174) on Stack Overflow. 
However, the largest set [12] available in the literature just 
contains around thirty thousand posts (only about 0.1% of 
17.2 million Stack Overflow posts). This set of posts was 
created with a keyword-matching approach using only the 
tags (i.e., encryption, cryptography, passwords, security, 
sql-injection, web-security, xss) of a post. There are many 
cases in which a security post does not have any of these 
seven tags. One such example is the post with question id 
3226374 on Stack Overflow2, discussing a cross-site script-
ing issue in PHP using only the tag php. More limitations of 
keyword matching are discussed in the next section. 
B. Keyword matching and its limitations 
The most straightforward way to determine the type of a 
post is by matching it with predefined keywords in the do-
main of interest (i.e., security). However, there are two ma-
jor drawbacks of such a keyword-matching approach. First-
ly, it requires considerable domain expertise and a tedious 
trial-and-error process to select appropriate keywords. For 
example, to our best knowledge, the most extensive list has 
security 127 keywords proposed by Pletea et al. [14]. How-
ever, based on our expertise, we have found out that such 
list is still missing many important security keywords. With 
further investigation, we found out that missing the keyword 
“ssh” (a cryptographic network protocol) alone would result 
in 32,216 potential posts being overlooked. 
Another important pitfall of keyword matching is that it 
is hard to balance between Precision (accurate information 
retrieval) and Recall (complete information retrieval). With 
fewer keywords, it is likely to miss many posts of interest 
(i.e., low recall) as demonstrated above. On the contrary, 
even with more relevant keywords, it does not guarantee a 
better matching accuracy. In fact, more keywords may result 
in a higher false-positive rate due to the multiple meanings 
of a word. For example, the word “exploit” in the previous 
security list [14] also means “take advantage of” some tech-
niques/tools in general, which is not necessarily related to a 
security attack. 
                                                          
2 https://stackoverflow.com/questions/3226374/cross-site-scripting-
phishing-through-frames 
3 
 
 
Fig. 2. Workflow of our proposed PUMiner framework for mining security-related posts from developer Q&A websites. 
Another example is the word “signed”, which is also a 
matching subword of non-security words like “assigned”. 
Therefore, a more reliable and generalized technique is re-
quired for addressing such drawbacks. 
C. The need for PU learning for retrieval of security posts 
Machine Learning (ML)-based binary classifiers can au-
tomatically identify important keywords to determine a type 
of interest. To build a binary classifier, we need to have both 
positive (i.e., security-related) and negative (i.e., non-
security related) posts. Unfortunately, there has not been 
such a large and reliable dataset containing both positive 
and negative classes in the literature. We have only identi-
fied a small number of positive posts with high confidence 
from Stack Overflow and Security StackExchange. Retriev-
ing non-security posts is also challenging since it should not 
contain any security context, which requires significant hu-
man effort to define and verify. Hence, there are many posts 
still left unlabelled (i.e., containing a mixture of positive and 
negative samples). This would violate the prerequisite con-
dition of developing a traditional binary classifier since the 
negative class is unknown [21, 30]. Nonetheless, this is a 
suitable case for PU learning to utilize both available Posi-
tive and Unlabelled samples [31]. Such observations have 
motivated us to formulate the identification of security posts 
on Q&A websites as a PU binary learning problem. 
Input representation is another major concern when 
building an ML model. In NLP, a textual post on a Q&A 
website can be represented using Bag-of-Words (BoW), n-
grams, or tf-idf. However, these traditional text representa-
tion techniques only support the exact matching of each 
word without considering its semantic meaning [32, 33]. For 
instance, “penetration-testing” or “pen-test” is usually used 
for vulnerability assessment (i.e., security-related context), 
but BoW, n-grams or tf-idf would treat “pen-test” and “se-
curity” as two totally different words. To address such 
drawback, word/document embeddings [16, 19] are utilized 
to incorporate the context (neighboring words) of a consid-
ering word. Therefore, our work would use context-aware 
word/document embeddings to represent the content of a 
discussion post to determine its security relevance. 
III. THE PUMINER FRAMEWORK 
A. Approach Overview 
We propose PUMiner to automatically perform large-
scale mining of security content from developer Q&A web-
sites using Postive and Unlabelled posts. The overall work-
flow of our proposed PUMiner is described in Fig. 2. There 
are three processes in PUMiner framework: (i) model selec-
tion, (ii) model building, and (iii) prediction. The model 
selection and building processes develop the optimal PU 
learning models, and the prediction process uses such mod-
els to predict the security relevance for a new post. It is not-
ed that the workflow of PUMiner can be customized to re-
trieve any topic of interest from developer Q&A websites. 
Model selection. There are three steps: (i) preprocess posts 
from Q&A websites, (ii) generate datasets for validation and 
training, and (iii) perform stratified k-fold cross-validation 
to select the best hyperparameters for our PU models. Step 
(i) accepts and preprocesses raw posts from Stack Overflow 
(the largest developer Q&A website) and Security 
StackExchange (security-focused Q&A site). Preprocessing 
techniques used for the title, question body, tags and answer 
of a post are covered in section III.B. Step (ii) takes the pre-
processed posts to create a reliable positive (security) da-
taset for PU learning. Although PU learning does not require 
the negative class, it still needs to learn the patterns from the 
positive class. We propose different heuristics in section 
III.C for building a positive dataset using both the tags and 
content of post title, question and answers. Such heuristics 
have been defined based on our expertise and references 
from CVE, NVD, CWE, CAPEC and OWASP. It should be 
noted that these heuristics are insufficient for retrieving se-
curity posts at full scale as described in section II.B. Besides 
the labelled positive set, step (ii) also obtains an unlabelled 
set to build a complete dataset for validating/training PU 
models. The validation set is separated into k folds. Each 
fold contains both labelled as security and unlabelled posts. 
The folds enter the last step (iii) to perform stratified k-
fold cross-validation. Stratification ensures that the ratio of 
each input source is kept throughout the cross-validation 
step, avoiding different data distribution of the folds. 
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Fig. 3. Workflow for building a security dataset using tag-based and content-based heuristics. 
In each iteration, k – 1 folds are used for training a model, 
while the remaining one is used for validating such model. 
In the training step of an iteration, textual posts and their 
tags are first fed into a doc2vec [19] embedding model to 
obtain fixed-length context-aware feature vectors. The em-
bedding model is also stored temporarily for inferring the 
vectors of the posts in both the training and validation folds. 
The trained feature vectors of the training folds then enter a 
two-stage PU learning model (see section III.D). The first 
step of PU learning identifies the reliable negative (non-
security) posts in the training folds to approximately trans-
form this PU learning problem into a fully-supervised learn-
ing one. After that, both positive (security) and reliable neg-
ative (non-security) posts in the training folds are used to 
train a traditional binary classifier to predict the type of each 
post. Such trained model is then evaluated on the validation 
fold. This whole training-validation process is repeated k 
times. The validation performance of a model is the average 
value of k runs. The model configurations with the highest 
value of performance metric would be selected as the opti-
mal ones for the next model building process. 
Model building. This process has two steps: (i) train a fea-
ture model to obtain feature vectors using doc2vec embed-
ding model, and (ii) train a PU learning model to predict the 
security relevance of a post with the optimal configurations 
from the previous process. In step (i), doc2vec embedding is 
trained on the whole dataset generated in step (ii) of the 
model selection process to obtain the context-aware feature 
vectors of each word in the posts and the posts themselves. 
This feature model is also saved to disk for looking up the 
vectors of future posts. Using the obtained features, step (ii) 
trains a two-stage PU learning model with the optimal con-
figurations of the model selection process. Lastly, such pre-
diction model is then saved to disk for future inference. 
Prediction. This process first reuses the same preprocessing 
module to clean a new post. The cleaned content is then 
converted into context-aware vectors by the feature model 
developed in the model building process. The trained PU 
learning model would use such features to determine wheth-
er the current post is related to security. We do not use tags 
for prediction since they may not capture the true topic of a 
post (e.g., the post 3226374 in section II.A). 
B. Preprocessing of discussion posts 
Discussion posts on Q&A websites contain too much 
noise for a learning model to be applied directly. The main 
problem with raw posts is the large vocabulary of the post 
content, which can make a learning model overfit [34]. Fol-
lowing the practices of the previous works [12, 13, 26], we 
first remove code snippets and outputs (within <pre><code> 
and </pre></code> tags) and HTML tags (e.g., <p> and 
</p>). Then, we remove stop words as well as punctuations. 
We leave security and software engineering keywords intact, 
e.g., “sql-injection”, “private-key”, or “x.509”. Moreover, 
we convert text to lowercase and perform Porter stemming 
[35] to remove duplicate forms of a word (e.g., “attack” vs. 
“attacks” vs. “Attacker”). We apply the same process for the 
title, question, tags, and answers of a post. 
C. Heuristics for building a security-related dataset 
Heuristics may miss many security posts (see section 
II.B), but they are still useful for gathering a decent positive 
dataset for PU learning. We propose a unified workflow in 
Fig. 3 for building a security-related dataset using both tag-
based and content-based filtering. Regarding the tag-
based filtering, inspired by Yang et al. [12], we select the 
tags whose frequency in the security context 
( /i itag security tag , |.| is the tag count) and popularity 
( /itag security security ) are larger than Thre1 and 
Thre2 thresholds, respectively. However, [12] only used the 
security tag to define the security context, while many other 
tags with “security” as subword (e.g., spring-security, fire-
base-security or android-security) are also related to securi-
ty on Stack Overflow. Therefore, we consider all tags with 
the subword “security” along with the security tag to select 
co-occurrent tags. We have adopted Thre1 = 0.1 and Thre2 
= 0.01 as in [12] and obtained five tags: cryptography, csrf, 
passwords, sql-injection and xss. We then retrieve all the 
posts with at least one of such tags to create the security 
settag. However, there is no standard procedure to assign tags 
[26] and there are still security posts with no security tag 
(e.g., post 3226374 in section II.A), requiring the examina-
tion of the content of other parts besides tags as well. 
Moving on to the content-based filtering for the re-
maining posts, we present the most up-to-date list of 234 
security keywords (see Appendix), which is two times larger 
than [14]. Such keywords are inherited from the existing list 
and gathered from the entities/frequent words in CVE, 
NVD, CWE, CAPEC and OWASP. We consider different 
forms (i.e., American/British English and with/without hy-
phen/space/stemming) of a keyword for matching to cope 
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with various (mis-)spellings. For example, variants of “im-
proper synchronization” include: improper/improp(-
)synchronisation/synchronization/synchron/synchronis. Like 
[14], to reduce false positives, we perform exact matching 
for short (three-character) keywords (e.g., md5) and sub-
word matching otherwise. For each post, we then extract the 
ratio of security words (kw_ratio), and how many security 
keywords appear in total (kw_count). kw_ratio ensures that 
a security word is not an outlier in the discussion. For in-
stance, the post 477816 on Stack Overflow has the word 
“security” in the question, but the discussion is mainly about 
JSON MIME type. A keyword may also have several mean-
ings, some of which are unrelated to security. For example, 
“hash” appears frequently in a post, but it refers to a data 
structure instead of cryptography. kw_count addresses such 
issue by increasing the coverage of security discussion in a 
post. We have obtained the thresholds a = 0.053 and b = 8 
for kw_ratio and kw_count, respectively, from unclosed 
Security StackExchange posts. We have selected such posts 
to ensure the security relevance. Using a and b, the content-
based filtering selects Stack Overflow posts whose kw_ratio 
≥ a and kw_count ≥ b to obtain setcontent of security posts. 
We combine settag and setcontent to form our security da-
taset from Stack Overflow. We have randomly sampled 385 
posts (statistically significant size [29]) from each settag and 
setcontent for two authors to independently examine the secu-
rity relevance. The disagreement proportions were only 
1.6% and 0.3% for settag and setcontent, respectively. When 
there was a conflict, the third author would be involved in 
the decision-making process. For settag, we encountered only 
two unclear security cases (< 1%), i.e., the posts 46178245 
and 10727000 did not explicitly mention the security pur-
poses for sanitizing input. For setcontent, all 385 posts checked 
were security-related. To extend PUMiner to other domains, 
relevant anchor tags of tag-based filtering and keywords of 
content-based filtering need to be updated accordingly. 
D. Context-aware two-stage PU learning model for mining 
security posts 
Traditional feature extraction methods like BoW, n-
grams, tf-idf only treat each word as a separate unit, without 
considering their semantic relationship [36, 37]. Word em-
beddings such as word2vec [16] have been proposed to in-
corporate the context of a word by maximizing the follow-
ing likelihood:
,
( | ; )
N
t i t
t ws i ws i t
P w w 
   
  . More specifical-
ly, word2vec optimizes its parameters ( ) to achieve the 
maximum probability of the context words appearing within 
a window size (ws) of the current word ( tw ). Doc2vec [19] 
extends word2vec to jointly learn the representation of a 
document (paragraph vector) with its constituent words. Our 
work adopts the distributed memory architecture to train 
doc2vec model as suggested in [19]. Regarding the label of 
a document/post, a post may contain multiple tags to de-
scribe complex concepts, e.g., php and security tags repre-
sent security issues (sql-injection) in PHP. Therefore, be-
sides single tags, we also combine all tags to handle the top-
ic mixture. For example, a post with php and security tags 
would have php_security alongside php, security and post id 
as labels. We also sort labels alphabetically to avoid dupli-
cates (e.g., php_security and security_php are the same). 
Algorithm 1. Context-aware two-stage PU learning model building. 
Input: List of posts: inP  
Labels of posts: { , }labels positive unlabelled  
Size of embeddings and Window size: sz, ws 
Classifier and its model configurations: C, config 
Output: The trained feature and PU models: feature_model, modelPU 
1 word_list, tag_list  empty list, empty list 
2 foreach i inp P  do 
3 words, tags tokenize ( )ip , extract_tags ( )ip  
4 word_list, tag_list word_list +  words , tag_list +  tags  
5 end foreach 
6 feature_model train_doc2vec(word_list, tag_list, sz, ws) 
7 inX  obtain_feature(feature_model, word_list) 
8 P  { | ( ) }p p in label p positive  x x X   
9 U  { | ( ) }p p in label p unlabelled  x x X  
10 Pcentroid , Ucentroid 
p
p P
P

x
 , 
p
p U
U

x
 
11 RN  empty list 
12 foreach i inx X do      // Stage-1 PU: Identify reliable negatives 
13 if ( , ) * ( , )i U i Pd dx centroid x centroid  do 
14 RN  RN +  ix  
15 end if 
16 end foreach 
17 modelPU  train_classifier(C, P, RN, config) // Stage-2 PU 
18 return feature_model, modelPU 
 
Next, we present the context-aware two-stage PU learn-
ing model to predict the security relevance of a post – the 
core of our PUMiner framework. Algorithm 1 describes the 
end-to-end PU model building. This algorithm requires a list 
of discussion posts with their respective labels (positive or 
unlabelled), along with the configurations of doc2vec (size 
of embeddings and window size) and classification models 
(model hyperparameters). The details are given hereafter. 
Lines 1-9: Learning context-aware feature vectors with 
doc2vec. Lines 1-5 tokenize text and extract tags of each 
post to prepare the data for training doc2vec models. Line 6 
trains a doc2vec embedding model with stochastic gradient 
descent to learn the context of words and posts. Line 7 then 
obtains the feature vector of each post using the trained 
doc2vec model. Lines 8 and 9 extract the embedding vectors 
of both positive and unlabelled posts, respectively. 
Lines 10-16: Stage one of PU learning model. Inspired by 
the existing studies of PU learning in other domains [38-41], 
we assume that the context-aware doc2vec embeddings can 
make posts of the same class stay in close proximity in the 
embedding space. Such assumption has been shown to hold 
in section V.A. Stage-one PU learning first identifies (relia-
ble/pure) negative (non-security) posts in the unlabelled set 
that are as different as possible from the positive set. A tra-
ditional binary classifier would work poorly in this case 
since the negative class is not pure [40]. This has been con-
firmed in section V.C. In line 10 of Algorithm 1, we propose 
to approximately locate unknown negative posts using the 
centroid (average) vectors of the known positive (centroidP) 
and unlabelled (centroidU) sets, respectively. Since the 
number of non-security posts is dominant (i.e., up to 96% on 
Stack Overflow, see section II.A), centroidU would repre-
sent the negative class more than the positive one. Lines 11-
16 compute and compare the cosine distances [16, 19, 40] 
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(see Eq. (1)) from each post to the two centroids. If the cur-
rent post is closer to centroidU (i.e., more towards the nega-
tive class), it would be selected as a reliable negative. 
cosine_distance ( , ) 1 i j
i j
d i j  

p p
p p

 (1) 
where ip  and jp  are the embedding vectors of the posts ith 
and jth, respectively. The range of cosine_distance is [0, 2]. 
We also propose a scaling factor ( ) to increase the flexi-
bility of our centroid-based approach, which would be joint-
ly optimized with other hyperparameters of binary classifi-
ers in the second stage. Besides having only one hyperpa-
rameter for tuning, this centroid-based approach can incre-
mentally learn a new post or a set of new posts very fast 
with O(1) complexity as given in Eq. (2). 
*
size( )
old new
new
new
N
N


centroid x
centroid
x
  (2) 
where oldcentroid , newcentroid  are the centroid vectors be-
fore and after learning new post(s) ( newx ), while N is the 
original number of posts in the positive or unlabelled set. 
Lines 17-18: Stage two of PU learning model. Using posi-
tive and (reliable) negative posts from the first stage, the 
second stage of PU learning (line 17) trains a binary classi-
fier with its hyperparameters. In the model building process, 
PU model is trained with the optimal classifier and its con-
figurations obtained from stratified k-fold cross-validation 
(see Fig. 2). Finally, line 18 saves the trained feature and PU 
models to disk for future inference. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND SETUP 
A. Dataset 
We gathered 17,278,709 posts on Stack Overflow (SO) 
as of July 2019 from BigQuery [42], and 52,611 posts on 
Security StackExchange (SSE) as of October 2019 from 
StackExchange Data Explorer [43]. Table 1 summarizes the 
number of tags and the word length of each part (i.e., title, 
question and answer) of posts from the two above Q&A 
sites. SSE and SO do not only have a similar format, but 
their data distributions also nearly resemble, except answers. 
We obtained 102,046 and 27,424 security posts for settag and 
setcontent (see Fig. 3), respectively. Settag was three times 
larger than the largest (30,054) previous set [12] and setcontent 
also had nearly the same size as [12], proving that our new 
heuristics and keywords are useful. We then randomly sam-
pled 181,696 posts from the remaining 17,149,239 unla-
belled ones to build the development set along with the secu-
rity posts from settag, setcontent and SSE (52,226 posts). 385 
random SSE posts with kw_count = 0 were put aside for a 
separate testing set, which will be explained later in this 
section. The development set had a ratio of one to one be-
tween security and unlabelled posts. 90% of the develop-
ment set was then randomly selected for model selection and 
model building, and the other 10% (Testdev) was for model 
prediction on unseen posts (see Fig. 2). Stratified sampling 
ensures that the proportion of each source would be kept. 
We used the whole development set to test our models 
on two more sets (Testnorm and Testhard), each containing 385 
(95% confidence level and 5% error [29]) manually-selected 
posts for each of the classes (security and non-security). 
TABLE 1. STATISTICS OF POSTS ON STACK OVERFLOW AND SECURITY 
STACKEXCHANGE. 
Source 
(no. of posts) 
Statistic Tag Title Question Answer 
Stack Overflow 
(17,278,709) 
Average 3.0 8.6 159.6 140.8 
Median 3.0 8.0 119.0 87.0 
Min 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 
Max 6.0 45.0 11,025.0 45,004.0 
Security 
StackExchange 
(52,611) 
Average 2.6 9.2 140.0 341.4 
Median 3.0 9.0 106.0 225.0 
Min 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 
Max 5.0 30.0 3,714.0 9,069.0 
The manual selection was conducted by one author and then 
carefully verified by two other authors. If no agreement 
could be reached, another post would be selected for exami-
nation until the size of each testing set was met. Specifical-
ly, Testnorm had 385 security posts and 385 non-security ones 
manually selected from the remaining unlabelled posts that 
were not in the development set. Testnorm was necessary 
since it had manually-checked label for each post, which 
facilitated an evaluation using both positive and negative 
classes. Testhard contained 385 positive (security-related) 
posts with kw_count = 0 on SSE (see section III.C) and 385 
negative (non-security) posts with kw_count > 0 on SO that 
were not in the development set, settag, setcontent or Testnorm. 
Testhard had extreme cases where our tag-based and content-
based keyword heuristics in section III.C totally failed. One 
such borderline security post is a concern about an app 
tracking user’s location on smartphone, which affects user’s 
privacy3. We have released all datasets of this work at [25]. 
B. Implementation of the PUMiner framework 
We have implemented our heuristics and PU learning 
models using scikit-learn [44], nltk [45] and Gensim [46] 
libraries in Python. The hyperparameters we considered for 
optimizing each model are given in Table 2. For doc2vec, 
we just used the default configurations since they do not 
make much of a difference as found in the previous studies 
[15, 36]. In addition, the six classifiers were selected based 
on the common practices in the literature [15, 47, 48] and in 
real data science competitions (e.g., Kaggle [49]). The first 
three (LR, SVM and KNN) are single models, while the 
other three (RF, XGB and LGBM) are ensemble ones. There 
were 260 model configurations for tuning in total. To select 
the optimal configurations for each model, we performed 
stratified 10-fold cross-validation. Due to the large scale of 
the dataset, we ran each fold as a computing job on a 
supercomputing cluster with at least ten cores and 400 MB 
of RAM. After that, we aggregated the results from multiple 
jobs to compute the performance of each cross-validation 
run. Such performance metrics are given in the next section. 
C. Evaluation metrics 
Retrieving security posts is a binary classification prob-
lem, which can be evaluated using: True Positive (TP), 
False Positive (FP), True Negative (TN), and False Negative 
(FN) [20]. There are also unlabelled posts in this work; thus, 
we present evaluation metrics for two different scenarios in 
Table 3: the development set (only Positive and Unlabelled 
(PU) posts are available), and the testing sets (Positive and 
Negative (PN) ground truths are known). 
                                                          
3 https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/190107/location-tracking 
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TABLE 2. HYPERPARAMETER TUNING FOR PUMINER. 
Modeling step Model Hyperparameters 
Context-aware 
feature embedding 
Doc2vec [19] Embedding size: 300 
Window size: 5 
Identification of 
reliable negatives 
Centroid-based approach 
(section III.D) 
Alpha ( ): 0.8, 0.9, 
1.0, 1.1, 1.2 
Prediction of the 
security relevance 
of a post 
Logistic Regression (LR) 
[50] 
Regularization coeffi-
cient: 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10, 
100 Support Vector Machine 
(SVM) [51] 
K-Nearest Neighbors 
(KNN) [52] 
Number of neighbors: 
11, 31, 51 
Distance weight: 
uniform, distance-
based 
Distance norm: 1, 2 
Random Forest (RF) [53] Number of estimators: 
100, 300, 500 
Max depth: unlimited 
Maximum number of 
leaf nodes: 100, 200, 
300, unlimited (RF) 
Extreme Gradient Boost-
ing (XGB) [54] 
Light Gradient Boosting 
Machine (LGBM) [55] 
We estimated r = 0.025 in PrecisionPU-UB by manually ex-
amining 385 posts in the unlabelled set. Eq. (3) shows the 
relationship between G-mean values of fully-supervised 
learning (G-meanPN) and PU learning (G-meanPU). 
2
2
22
P  R P  RG-mean P R
( 1) R ( 1)
ˆ( 1 | 1) R (Definition of P and R)
ˆ( 1| 1) ( 1)
ˆ RR G-mean (Bayes' rules, . :size)
ˆ ˆ( 1) 1
PN
PU
P y P y
P y y
P y y P y
y
P y y
    
  
  
   

  
 
 (3) 
where P and R are Precision and Recall, respectively. 
G-mean is directly proportional to Precision and Recall, 
similar to F1-Score. Also, P(y=1) is a constant for the same 
dataset; hence, the model ranking using G-meanPN is the 
same as G-meanPU. Therefore, we used G-meanPU as the 
determinant metric to select the optimal PU learning model. 
G-meanPU is the best metric for PU learning, but its value 
can be arbitrarily larger than one. Thus, we needed other 
metrics in Table 3 to provide a more human-interpretable 
yet less accurate evaluation of PUMiner. For evaluating on 
the ground-truth datasets, we also used MCC since it con-
siders the results of both the positive and negative classes. 
V. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND RESULTS 
A. RQ1: Is PUMiner effective for mining security posts 
from developer Q&A websites? 
Motivation. Our work formulates the retrieval of security 
posts on Q&A websites as a PU learning problem. RQ1 
evaluates the first attempt to address this new problem with 
PUMiner. Our framework allows researchers and practition-
ers to gather security information without the negative class. 
Approach. We first visualize the doc2vec feature vectors 
using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [21]. We then 
perform stratified 10-fold cross-validation and report the 
results of different configurations of PUMiner (see Table 2) 
with respect to the first six evaluation metrics in Table 3. 
Results. We first showed that doc2vec context-aware em-
beddings could capture the transition from the non-security 
to security regions (i.e., yellow to purple based on the secu-
rity keyword count (kw_count)) in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. 
TABLE 3. EVALUATION METRICS FOR MODELS OF PUMINER FRAMEWORK. 
Metric and Formula Description 
1. Precision PPU LB
P U
TP
TP TP FP

 
, PTP  & 
UTP : ˆ 1y  in the positive and unlabelled sets, 
yˆ : predicted label, y : true label. 
Minimum Precision 
when only TP in the 
positive set is counted. 
TP in U is unknown, 
and thus not counted. 
min( , )
2. Precision P UPU UB
P U
TP r U TP FP
TP TP FP
  

 
, 
r: the ratio of security posts in U, |U|: size of U. 
Maximum Precision 
when a model is as-
sumed to obtain all 
security posts in U. 
3. Recall PPU
P P
TP
TP FN


(RecallPU  RecallPN ) 
Approximated Recall 
for PU learning [56] 
2 Precision Recall4. F1-Score
Precision Recall
PU LB PU
PU LB
PU LB PU



 

  
Minimum F1-Score 
for PU learning 
2 Precision Recall5. F1-Score
Precision Recall
PU UB PU
PU UB
PU UB PU



 

 
Maximum F1-Score 
for PU learning 
2ˆ R
6. G-mean
ˆ 1PU
y
y



 
G-mean for PU Learn-
ing (Eq. (3)) 
7. PrecisionPN
TP
TP FP


 
Precision on ground-
truth posts 
8. RecallPN
TP
TP FN


 
Recall on ground-truth 
posts 
2 Precision Recall9. F1-Score
Precision Recall
PN PN
PN
PN PN
 

 
F1-Score on ground-
truth posts 
10. G-mean Precision RecallPN PN PN    G-mean on ground-truth posts 
11. MCC
( )( )( )( )
PN
TP TN FP FN
TP FP TP FN TN FP TN FN
  
   
  
Matthews correlation 
coefficient on ground-
truth posts 
This confirmed our assumption in section III.D that the 
same-class posts would be close to each other in their re-
spective regions, and thus making them distinguishable. Fig. 
5 also demonstrated that there was only a tiny portion of 
security (purple) posts in the unlabelled set. This finding 
supported the argument that the unlabelled centroid could 
approximately represent the negative class in the centroid-
based approach of our two-stage PU learning model. 
Next, Table 4 summarizes the optimal validation results 
of each classifier. XGB with number of estimators = 500, 
max_depth = unlimited, and max_leaf_nodes = 300 per-
formed the best (nearly 0.9) in every metric. No common 
optimal configuration was found for all models, suggesting 
that tuning process is important [15, 57, 58]. Also, the ratio 
of security to unlabelled posts was 1:1, and about 2.5% of 
the unlabelled set were security (see section IV.C), implying 
that 51.25% of the whole set was security. Thus, G-meanPN 
(XGB) = G-mean ( 1)PU P y  = 1.611 0.5125 = 0.909. 
 
Fig. 4. Embeddings of security posts in our development set. Note: The 
color bar shows the number of keywords in our security list of a post. 
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Fig. 5. Embeddings of unlabelled posts in our development set. Note: The 
color bar shows the number of keywords in our security list of a post. 
The worst approximated G-meanPN (KNN) was still 0.863, 
meaning that PUMiner performed well in overall (> 0.85 G-
meanPN) for retrieving security posts from Q&A sites. 
TABLE 4. CROSS-VALIDATION PERFORMANCE OF 
THE OPTIMAL MODELS OF SIX CLASSIFIERS. 
Metric LR SVM KNN RF XGB LGBM 
RecallPU 0.869 0.869 0.893 0.862 0.893 0.893 
PrecisionPU-LB 0.876 0.876 0.815 0.853 0.903 0.902 
PrecisionPU-UB 0.901 0.901 0.838 0.878 0.928 0.927 
F1-ScorePU-LB 0.873 0.873 0.852 0.857 0.898 0.897 
F1-ScorePU-UB 0.885 0.885 0.864 0.870 0.910 0.910 
G-meanPU 1.521 1.521 1.454 1.468 1.611 1.609 
Next, Table 5 reports the performance of single (LR, 
SVM, and KNN) and ensemble (RF, XGB, and LGBM) 
models. Ensemble models were better than single counter-
parts in all metrics except Precision (mostly due to the poor 
performance of RF). Such differences were confirmed to be 
statistically significant by one-tailed non-parametric Mann-
Whitney U-test [59] and non-negligible with Cohen’s d ef-
fect size [60] (larger than 0.2 [61]). PrecisionPU-UB and F1-
ScorePU-UB had the same patterns as PrecisionPU-LB and F1-
ScorePU-LB, respectively. We suggest that ensemble models 
(LGBM and XGB) should be preferred. 
We also investigated the effect of alpha ( ) hyperpa-
rameter in the first stage of PUMiner on the performance 
(see Fig. 6). Higher values of alpha resulted in higher Preci-
sion and lower Recall. Intuitively, increasing alpha would 
move the selected negatives more towards the real positive 
class. It would then make the negative class noisier (i.e., 
more security posts in it), and produce more false negatives 
(low Recall) yet fewer false positives (high Precision). Al-
pha ≥ 1 also gave more stable (less changing) results than 
alpha < 1, and produced better average F1-Score and G-
mean. This finding was confirmed when five out of six clas-
sifiers used alpha = 1.1 in their optimal models; whereas, 
KNN used alpha = 0.9. It might be because KNN is in-
stance-based learning [21, 30], and thus it requires more 
refined/reliable negatives to learn the patterns. We recom-
mend trying alpha ≥ 1 first for better baseline performance. 
TABLE 5. P-VALUES OF HYPOTHESIS TESTS AND COHEN’S D EFFECT SIZES OF 
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BETWEEN ENSEMBLE AND SINGLE MODELS. 
NOTES: (*): H0: ENSEMBLE ≤ SINGLE AND (**): H0: SINGLE ≤ ENSEMBLE.  
Evaluation 
metric 
Ensemble 
model 
Single 
model P-value 
Cohen’s 
d effect 
size 
RecallPU 0.914 0.838 8.07 x 10-8 (*) 0.785 
PrecisionPU-LB 0.773 0.820 1.60 x 10-4 (**) 0.374 
F1-ScorePU-LB 0.827 0.810 9.12 x 10-4 (*) 0.287 
G-meanPU 1.400 1.344 6.17 x 10-4 (*) 0.337 
 
Fig. 6. Effect of alpha on the average performance of PU learning models. 
Notes: Right axis is for G-meanPU. Left axis is for the other three metrics. 
B. RQ2: How does PUMiner perform compared to other 
learning approaches for mining security posts from 
developer Q&A websites? 
Motivation. We can retrieve security posts using positive-
only learning, a.k.a. novelty detection. One-class SVM (OC-
SVM) [23, 62] is widely used for novelty detection by 
building a positive-class boundary with a max-margin SVM, 
while the region outside the boundary would be the negative 
class. Another novelty-detection method, Positive-Similarity 
Filtering (PSF) [24], classifies a new document as positive if 
the cosine similarity between its feature vector and that of 
any existing labelled positive document is higher than a 
threshold. RQ2 compares PUMiner with OC-SVM, PSF, 
and one-stage (centroid-based learning) PU (1-PU) models. 
Approach. RQ2 compares the performance of the optimal 
PUMiner model in RQ1 on three unseen testing sets (Testdev, 
Testnorm and Testhard in section IV.A) against OC-SVM, PSF 
and 1-PU models. We optimize the baseline models on 90% 
data of the development set similarly to PUMiner. OC-SVM 
and PSF are only trained on positive samples and the same 
context-aware features are used for each model. 
Results. Table 6 shows the optimal hyperparameters of the 
three baseline models. We compared such models with the 
optimal PUMiner model (XGB) reported in RQ1. 
TABLE 6. HYPERPARAMETER TUNING FOR THE BASELINE MODELS. 
NOTE: THE OPTIMAL CONFIGURATIONS ARE IN BOLD. 
Model Hyperparameter Values 
1-PU alpha 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.1, 1.2 
OC-SVM kernel linear, rbf 
nu (Proportion of  
non-security posts) 
0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 
0.9 
PSF similarity threshold 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 
On Testdev, PUMiner performed the best in five out of six 
metrics (see Table 7), surpassing the second-best model (1-
PU) by 16.7% in terms of G-meanPU. OC-SVM had the 
highest RecallPU, but it had very low Precision since it 
marked most of the posts as security. 
TABLE 7. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON ON THE TESTDEV SET. NOTE: SCALED 
VALUES OF G-MEANPU BY P(Y=1) = 0.5125 ARE IN THE PARENTHESES. 
Evaluation 
metric PUMiner 1-PU OC-SVM PSF 
RecallPU 0.892 0.783 0.985 0.650 
PrecisionPU-LB 0.904 0.882 0.506 0.513 
PrecisionPU-UB 0.929 0.910 0.518 0.532 
F1-ScorePU-LB 0.898 0.830 0.668 0.573 
F1-ScorePU-UB 0.910 0.842 0.679 0.585 
G-meanPU 
1.610 
(0.908) 
1.380 
(0.841) 
0.995 
(0.714) 
0.665 
(0.584) 
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TABLE 8. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON ON THE TESTNORM AND TESTHARD SETS. 
NOTE: THE RESULTS ON THE TESTHARD SET ARE IN PARENTHESES. 
Model RecallPN PrecisionPN F1-ScorePN 
G-
meanPN MCCPN 
PUMiner 0.951 (0.745) 
0.943 
(0.973) 
0.947 
(0.844) 
0.947 
(0.852) 
0.894 
(0.745) 
1-PU 0.849 (0.600) 
0.951 
(0.991) 
0.897 
(0.748) 
0.899 
(0.771) 
0.810 
(0.647) 
OC-
SVM 
0.951 
(0.948) 
0.499 
(0.489) 
0.654 
(0.645) 
0.688 
(0.681) 
-0.012 
(-0.13) 
PSF 0.377 (0.758) 
0.833 
(0.692) 
0.519 
(0.724) 
0.560 
(0.724) 
0.360 
(0.423) 
This behavior would not be useful in practice. The promis-
ing results of 1-PU model might be because of the reasona-
ble separability of security and non-security posts illustrated 
in RQ1. PSF was the worst-performing model in this case. 
Table 8 reports the performance on the labelled Testnorm 
and Testhard sets, where the true estimation of traditional 
classification metrics can be computed. PUMiner obtained 
the best overall performance for both testing sets. On Test-
norm, PUMiner outperformed the three baseline models in all 
metrics, except RecallPN for OC-SVM and PrecisionPN for 1-
PU model. MCCPN of PUMiner was 0.084, 0.534 and 0.906 
points higher than those of 1-PU, PSF and OC-SVM mod-
els, respectively. OC-SVM had the best RecallPN, but its 
MCCPN was negative and even worse than a random classi-
fier. 1-PU model had the best PrecisionPN, yet its RecallPN 
was much lower than PUMiner. On Testhard, PUMiner pro-
duced the best MCCPN value of 0.745, which was 0.098, 
0.322 and 0.875 points superior to those of 1-PU, PSF and 
OC-SVM models, respectively. We also recorded that OC-
SVM had the highest RecallPN yet poor PrecisionPN, and vice 
versa for 1-PU model on Testhard. Also, PSF was the worst 
model with the lowest F1-Score and G-mean for identifying 
security posts. In addition, the results were reasonable that 
Testnorm > Testdev and Testhard < Testdev since Testdev contains 
both normal and borderline test cases, proving that our sam-
ple selection was not biased. These findings have reinforced 
the potential value of using unlabelled data and the second 
stage of PUMiner. Importantly, the heuristics in section 
III.C could not correctly detect the type of any post in Test-
hard, which highlights the usefulness of PUMiner for reliable 
and large-scale security posts mining from Q&A websites. 
C. RQ3: How do the source and size of training data affect 
the performance of PUMiner? 
Motivation. The major advantage of PU learning is working 
with partially labelled positive samples and a large amount 
of unlabelled data, which cannot be handled by traditionally 
fully-supervised learning. RQ3 investigates the impact of 
data source and size on the performance of PUMiner. 
Approach. We first investigate different security datasets: 
settag, setcontent and Security StackExchange (see section 
IV.A). We then change the amount of labelled positive and 
unlabelled data to evaluate our PUMiner in different scenar-
ios. We also compare the optimal PUMiner model with a 
fully supervised model that considers all unlabelled data as 
pseudo-negatives (PPN) to investigate the impact of the 
unlabelled set on the model performance. We use the same 
optimal model configurations of PUMiner and features for 
PPN. We also only report the results on the Testnorm and 
Testhard sets as Testdev changes with each value of the posi-
tive ratio, which makes the results incomparable. 
 
Fig. 7. MCCPN of different positive datasets on the Testnorm and Testhard sets. 
Notes: SO-sec is our security dataset extracted from Stack Overflow 
(settag + setcontent). SSE is Security StackExchange only. 
Results. Fig. 7 shows that Stack Overflow (SO) was more 
helpful for identifying the security posts in Testnorm set, 
while Security StackExchange (SSE) contributed more in-
formation to predicting the posts in Testhard set. The security 
posts extracted from SO (SO-sec) using our heuristics were 
more refined, while discussion on SSE was less restricted 
due to the informal nature of Q&A forums. Thus, the normal 
security posts were better captured using the patterns of SO-
sec. In contrast, the security context of the posts in Testhard 
was less explicit; hence, the more diverse content of SSE 
could better cover such borderline cases. Overall, combining 
both SO-sec and SSE sources has been useful for retrieving 
security posts in both normal and extreme scenarios. Settag 
also outperformed setcontent in both cases, probably due to the 
nearly four-time difference in size (102,046 vs. 27,424). 
Next, when varying the ratio of security to unlabelled 
posts, PUMiner consistently had higher MCCPN than PPN 
(see Fig. 8). This has demonstrated that fully-supervised 
learning is not as effective as PUMiner when there is unla-
belled data, confirming our statement made in section III.D. 
PPN was also seen to approach PUMiner in Testnorm as the 
ratio increased. A reason might be that the result became 
more dominated by the increasing size of the positive set 
than the same positive posts in the unlabelled set. It should 
be noted that PUMiner also outperformed 1-PU, OC-SVM 
and PSF models for each value of the positive ratio. 
We also examined the case when the unlabelled set in-
creased by ten and 100 times (i.e., 1,346,926 and 12,999,226 
posts). For the 1:10 case, PUMiner achieved MCCPN of 0.78 
and 0.46 for Testnorm and Testhard sets, respectively. With 
100-time noisier data, MCCPN values of PUMiner were still 
0.65 (Testnorm) and 0.35 (Testhard), significantly surpassing 
PPN by 160% and 106%, respectively. This result demon-
strates the robustness of PUMiner for information retrieval 
on Q&A sites even with a large amount of unlabelled data. 
 
Fig. 8. MCCPN of PUMiner and PPN on the Testnorm and Testhard sets with 
different ratios of security to unlabelled posts in the development set. 
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VI. DISCUSSION 
A. PUMiner framework and beyond 
We have demonstrated that PUMiner is the best security-
retrieval model in section V. Moreover, PUMiner is efficient 
as it took only 1,400 seconds to learn 360,000 posts in the 
development set, and less than four seconds to predict the 
security relevance for 770 posts in each of the sets (Testnorm 
and Testhard). PUMiner also allows incremental training on 
new posts, making it suitable to keep up with the fast and 
large-scale update of Q&A websites. Using the optimal 
PUMiner model in RQ1 and our heuristics with kw_count ≥ 
5 and kw_ratio ≥ 0.03, we have identified and released 
104,024 new security posts on Stack Overflow (only 1% FP 
in 385 random posts) at [25] for future software security 
study. PUMiner can be extended to 170+ other topics on 
StackExchange [63], many of which are related to Software 
Engineering such as mobile, game, and web development. 
We still found several misclassification patterns that can 
improve PUMiner in future work. For FPs, PUMiner strug-
gled with the non-security posts about tools appearing in the 
security context, e.g., SO-1967980/44775539 about Spring 
(boot) framework were confused with Spring security. For 
FNs, PUMiner tended to miss security posts with implicit 
security context (e.g., SSE-34394 about REcon security con-
ference or SO-37183524 about OAuth yet embedded in links 
and function calls), or about infrequent (< 1%) security tools 
or techniques (e.g., SSE-134794 about Snort or SO-
16455365 about Diffie-Hellman). Snort and Diffie-Hellman 
only appeared in 432 and 1,426 posts, respectively, out of 
181,696 total posts in our security dataset in section IV.A. 
B. Threats to validity 
One potential threat to validity is with our data selection. 
We did use random sampling to avoid any bias. Our testing 
sets still involved human judgment, but we performed cross-
checking with three people to make sure that the selected 
ones were as accurate and objective as possible. 
Another threat is that our optimal hyperparameters of 
PUMiner might not produce the absolute highest results. 
However, it is nearly impossible to try all the combinations. 
To minimize this threat, we tried to follow the practices of 
previous work, and then ran our models multiple times with 
stratified 10-fold cross-validation. We also showed that 
PUMiner performed much better than other existing models. 
Our generalizability is also a concern. We used the larg-
est training dataset, statistically significant size of testing 
sets [29], and confirmed our results with a statistical confi-
dence level > 95%. We also published our code and models 
at [25] to support future reuse and extension of PUMiner. 
VII. RELATED WORK 
A. Stack Overflow for Software Engineering research 
Stack Overflow (SO) has long been used to support var-
ious Software Engineering (SE) tasks such as API us-
age/documentation [64-66], code comment generation [67], 
code debugging/fixing [68, 69] and code clone detection 
[70, 71]. Among the studies, [64] was evaluated in the con-
text of unlabelled data; however, their labelled dataset con-
tained both the positive and negative classes. Thus, it was 
less challenging than our study since we only have labelled 
positive posts and no negative class. Other studies identified 
topics of different domains [26, 72-74] on SO using unsu-
pervised models (e.g., Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) 
[75]), requiring no label. However, it is nearly impossible to 
directly guide such topic models to retrieve domain-specific 
posts. In addition, tag recommendation on Q&A websites is 
related to our task, but most of the existing techniques [76-
78] required fully labelled data (post-tag pairs). It is also 
very difficult to obtain all relevant tags of a domain. 
B. Mining security knowledge from open sources 
Yang et al. [12] identified and analyzed thirty security 
topics on SO using LDA [75]. However, they only obtained 
30,054 security posts, which were at least six times fewer 
than our work. Such missing posts may lead to an overlook 
of current security issues and countermeasures. There is also 
active research on software vulnerabilities analytics using 
CVE/NVD [15, 79, 80], but these sources do not support 
online discussion for developers, and security issues and 
countermeasures may not be updated in time [81, 82]. Pletea 
et al. [14] proposed a list of security keywords to perform 
sentimental analysis of security discussions on GitHub. 
However, we have shown that this list still misses many 
security keywords (e.g., buffer-overflow, directory-
traversal, and vulnerability). Our work has proposed an 
updated list (see Appendix) that has two times more security 
keywords than [14]. Recently, [83] and [24] have used nov-
elty detection methods to retrieve security-related content. 
We have shown that PUMiner utilizing unlabelled data per-
formed much better than one-class SVM and positive-
similarity filtering used in these two studies. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We have proposed a novel framework, PUMiner, to au-
tomatically mine security content from Q&A websites 
where only some positive posts are known and the rest is 
unlabelled. Extensive experiments on more than 17.3 mil-
lion posts from Stack Overflow and Security StackExchange 
have shown that PUMiner is a promising approach with at 
least 0.85 validation F1-Score and G-mean. On unseen test-
ing posts, PUMiner significantly outperformed one-class 
SVM, positive-similarity filtering and one-stage PU models, 
respectively. PUMiner also predicted the cases where key-
word matching totally missed with an MCC of 0.745. Nota-
bly, with only 1% labelled positive posts, PUMiner still 
achieved an MCC of 0.65, which was 160% better than ful-
ly-supervised learning. Overall, PUMiner helps to reduce 
the human effort to retrieve information from large-scale 
and mostly unlabelled open sources in the SE community. 
In the future, we would like to extend our PUMiner to 
other related domains such as security vulnerability analyt-
ics. We also plan to develop more sophisticated models and 
incorporate them into PUMiner to improve the effectiveness 
of information retrieval on developer Q&A websites. 
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